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Humans are creatures of routine and habit. When faced with situations in which a default option is available, people show a consistent
tendency to stick with the default. Why this occurs is unclear. To elucidate its neural basis, we used a novel gambling task in conjunction
with functionalmagnetic resonance imaging.Behavioral results revealed that participantsweremore likely to choose thedefault cardand
felt enhancedemotional responses tooutcomesaftermaking thedecision to switch.Weshowthat increased tendency to switchaway from
the default during the decision phasewas associatedwith decreased activity in the anterior insula; activation in this same area in reaction
to “switching away from the default and losing” was positively related with experienced frustration. In contrast, decisions to choose the
default engaged the ventral striatum, the same reward area as seen in winning. Our findings highlight aversive processes in the insula as
underlying the default bias and suggest that choosing the default may be rewarding in itself.
Introduction
Whether it is selecting weekly lottery numbers or renewal of an
annual insurance policy, we are repeatedly faced with situations
in which we must accept the default option or switch to an alter-
native. While such decisions often incur a gain or loss of
money or other commodity, studies have shown that even
when these are equated, an increased preference for the default
is found (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Johnson and
Goldstein, 2003). Yet, why this occurs is unclear.
Several explanations have been proposed. For example, in some
circumstances defaults may be seen as optimal or recommended
options, such as buying rental car insurance, and so people aremore
likely to select them. Alternatively, individuals may be reluctant to
switch away fromdefaults because switching involves greatermental
or physical effort (Anderson, 2003). However, even when effort is
equated, there is evidence that anticipation of loss (“loss aversion”)
may impel the default preference (Kahneman et al., 1991). This is
because although choosing defaults and non-defaults could both
result in the same negative outcomes, individuals’ subjective evalu-
ation of these two types of aversive outcomes is different. Studies
from behavioral economics using hypothetical scenarios show that
individuals exhibitmore regretwhennegative outcomes result from
atypical actions versus routine actions (Kahneman and Miller,
1986). Thus, individuals aremorewilling to choose defaults to avoid
the enhanced negative emotion associated with choosing non-
defaults. Of course, default and non-default options can also be as-
sociated with gains. However, the greater emphasis on loss is
explained by the proposal that anticipated losses loom larger than
anticipated gains (Kahneman et al., 1991).
It remains unknown, however, how the act of choosing a non-
default option modulates the neurophysiological representation
of the experienced hedonic value of a stimulus, as well as our
emotional response to it. Moreover, previous studies cannot tell
us if it is aversive to switch away from or even rewarding to stay
with the default. For example, one might predict that the act of
switching (before win/loss outcome) is associated with brain ar-
eas such as the insula, which are involved in anticipation and
receipt of aversive stimuli (Clark et al., 2008; Preuschoff et al.,
2008). Conversely, it is possible that sticking with the default is
associated with reward systems (e.g., ventral striatum). To ad-
dress these questions directly, we used functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) in conjunction with a novel gambling task
that comprised two phases. During a decision phase, one gam-
bling cardwas assigned to the participant and they had the option
to either stay with this default card or switch to another; the
following outcome phase indicated the value of the cards and the
amount won or lost. Our design allowed us to identify the neural
correlates of switch and stay choices and to test the hypothesis
that the neurobiological representation of an outcome’s subjec-
tive value is exaggerated after switching away from the default.
Further, our design controlled the effort associated with deciding




Participants. Eighteen healthy volunteers (8 males; mean age  SD,
22.4 3.2) participated in return for payment. All participantswere right
handed, were fluent speakers of English, and were screened for psychiat-
ric or neurological problems. The study was authorized by the National
Health Service Local Research Ethics Committee for Cambridge. All par-
ticipants gavewritten, informed consent andwere informed of their right
to discontinue participation at any time.
Experimental paradigm.On each trial, participants were first presented
with the value of two possible outcomes, a potential win and a potential
loss for 4 s. Following this, they were then presented with two cards, one
of which was the default card assigned to the participant, highlighted in
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yellow (Fig. 1A). Participants were required to choose either to stay with
the default card or switch to the other card by pressing the key that
corresponded to the position of the card,within 4 s. Finally, the outcomes
associated with both cards were presented for 4 s. Unknown to partici-
pants, the outcomes were predetermined so that they lost 50% of the
time. The magnitude of winning and losing was manipulated indepen-
dently, each ranging from £10 to £80, in increments of £10, to maintain
participants’ interest. The stimulus presentation and response recording
was controlled by E-prime. The whole experiment included 128 trials
and lasted 28 min. Before the experiment, participants were told that
the total amount ofmoney they accumulated in the experiment would be
exchanged into real monetary reward at a certain exchange rate. At the
end of the experiment, all participants were rewarded £10 bonus in ad-
dition to the standard payment for participation.
Postscan questionnaires. After the end of the experiment, participants
were asked to indicate how frustrated they felt when they lost after
switching and when they lost after staying with the default on a 10 point
analog Likert scale (1 not at all; 10 very intensely). For example, we
used questions like “How frustrated did you feel in the following situa-
tions?” and presented two snapshot images of the two types of losing
outcomes (losses after switching and losses after staying) underneath the
questions. They were also asked to indicate how satisfied they felt when
they won after switching and when they won after staying.
Computational analysis.The standard temporal difference (TD)model
was used to examine the possible learning effect. In the TD model, the
value Vi for each gambling card is updated whenever it is chosen. Specif-
ically, whenever gambling card i was chosen, its predicted value Vi was
updated in the direction of the obtained reward r using a delta rule with
learning-rate parameter : Vi  Vi   (r – Vi). The probability of
choosing option iwas taken to follow a “softmax” distribution in its value
(i.e., p2  exp(tV2)/[exp(tV2)  exp(tV1)]). Free parameters (learning
rate , softmax inverse temperature t) were selected per subject to opti-
mize the likelihood of that subject’s sequence of choices (i.e., the product
of the probability of each choice, defined as above, over all trials). As
measures of the quality of model fit, we compare the negative log likeli-
hoods of the data with the negative log likelihoods assuming purely ran-
dom choices.
Image acquisition. MRI scanning was conducted at the Medical Re-
search Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit on a 3 tesla Tim Trio
Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner (Siemens) using a head coil gradi-
ent set. Whole-brain data were acquired with echo planar T2*-weighted
imaging (EPI), sensitive to blood oxygenation level-dependent signal
contrast [48 sagittal slices, 3 mm thickness; repetition time, 2400 ms;
echo time (TE), 25ms; flip angle 90°; field of
view, 224 mm; voxel size, 3  3  3 mm). To
allow for equilibration effects, the first three
volumes were discarded. T1-weighted struc-
tural images were acquired at a resolution of
1 1 1 mm.
Image preprocessing. SPM5 software (www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) was used for data anal-
ysis. The EPI images were sync interpolated in
time for correction of slice-timing differences
and realigned to the first scan by rigid-body
transformations to correct for head move-
ments. Field maps were estimated from the
phase difference between the images acquired
at the short and long TE and unwrapped, using
the FieldMap toolbox. Field map and EPI pa-
rameters were used to establish voxel displace-
ments in the EPI image. Application of the
inverse displacement to the EPI images served
in the correction of distortions. Utilizing linear
and nonlinear transformations, and smooth-
ing with a Gaussian kernel of full-width-half-
maximum 8 mm, EPI and structural images
were coregistered and normalized to the T1
standard template in Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) space (MNI—International
Consortium for Brain Mapping). Global
changes were removed by proportional scaling and high-pass temporal
filtering with a cutoff of 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts in signal.
Statistical analysis. After preprocessing, statistical analysis was per-
formed using the general linear model. Analysis was performed to estab-
lish each participant’s voxelwise activation during the stay or switch
decision epochs and actual outcome epochs. Activated voxels in each
experimental context were identified using an event-related statistical
model representing the six experimental conditions (stay choices, switch
choices, losses after switch, losses after stay, wins after switch, and wins
after stay), convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function
andmean corrected. Six head-motion parameters defined by the realign-
mentwere added to themodel as regressors of no interest.Multiple linear
regression was then run to generate parameter estimates for each regres-
sor at every voxel. A random-effects analysis (one-sample t test) was
performed to analyze data at a group level. All conjunction analyses were
performed using the SPM 5 conjunction null function (Friston et al.,
2005). Small volume correction (svc) was used on a priori regions of
interest including the following: (1) the anterior insula, which was de-
fined by restricting the structural template for the insula derived from
automated anatomical labeling (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) to the
region anterior to the anterior commissure plane (i.e., y 0); (2) ventral
striatum—10 mm sphere at14, 10, and10 (O’Doherty et al., 2004);
and (3) Caudate (dorsal striatum), defined by the corresponding auto-
mated anatomical labeling mask. Activations in other areas are reported
if they survive p  0.001 uncorrected, cluster size k  10. For display
purposes, all images are depicted at p 0.005.
Experiment 2
One concern regarding experiment 1 is whether emotion ratings obtained
after the experiment provide a reliable estimate of emotions experienced
during the task. To address this, we conducted a behavioral study recording
both trial-by-trial emotion ratings and postexperiment ratings.
Participants. Fifteen healthy volunteers (6 males; mean age  SD,
24.6 2.7) participated in return for payment. All participantswere right
handed, were fluent speakers of English, and were screened for psychiat-
ric or neurological problems. The study was authorized by the National
Health Service Local Research Ethics Committee for Cambridge. All par-
ticipants gavewritten, informed consent andwere informed of their right
to discontinue participation at any time.
Experimental paradigm.We used the same experimental task but with
twomodifications: first, after each win or loss outcome participants were
required to indicate how frustrated or how satisfied they felt using a 10
Figure 1. A, The experimental paradigm. B, Frequency of switching for 18 participants. Red horizontal line indicates themean
frequencyof switching.C,D, Participants feltmore frustratedwhen they lost after switchingaway fromthedefault thanwhen they
lost after staying with the default (C), and more satisfied when they won after switching away from the default than when they
won after staying with the default (D).
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point visual analog scale (1 not at all, 10 very intensely). Second, the
task was self-paced, and participants pressed a key when they finished





Participants revealed a preference for the default card (57.2% stay
vs 42.8% switch, t17  4.53, p  0.001) (Fig. 1B). However,
reaction times for switch and stay were comparable (mean SD,
1086  471 ms for switch vs 1050  411 ms for stay, t17  1),
suggesting that the difference inmental effort involved in switch-
ing was negligible.
Subjective emotion ratings after the experiment showed thatpar-
ticipants felt stronger frustration for losses after switch (Lswitch) than
after stay (Lstay) (t173.43,p0.005) (Fig. 1C) and expressedmore
satisfaction for wins after switch (Wswitch) than after stay (Wstay)
(t17 3.39, p 0.005) (Fig. 1D).
We also examined the possible effects of feedback from the
immediately preceding trial on stay or switch choices.We did not
find a significant main effect of previous winning or losing out-
come (F(1,17)  0.33, p  0.5) nor a main effect of previous
staying or switching choices (F(1,17) 0.74, p 0.4). No interac-
tion between these two factors was found (F(1,17) 1.58, p 0.2).
Using the standard TDmodel, we did not find a significant learn-
ing effect. The errors resulting from the TDmodel did not signif-
icantly differ from the errors resulting from the model assuming
purely random choices (i.e., choosing to stay with 50% chance)
(t17 1.84, p 0.05).
fMRI results
Decision phase: switch versus stay. During the decision phase (i.e.,
4 s from the onset of the default and non-default cards to their
offset), switch choices (relative to stay choices) activated the right
anterior insula [40, 12, 10; peak z  4.35; p  0.05 svc) (Fig.
2A). Further, for the switch minus stay contrast, increased fre-
quency of switching was significantly correlated with decreased
activity in right anterior insula [40, 14, 2; peak z 3.05; p 0.05
svc] and increased activity in left caudate [18, 22, 12; peak z
3.62; p 0.05 svc] (Fig. 2A,C). Our data suggest that the relative
balance of insula and caudate activity in the decision phase may
be associated with participants’ decisions to stay or switch.
In contrast, stay choices (relative to switch) activated the left
ventral striatum (18, 6, 6; peak z  3.08; p  0.05 svc) (Fig.
2B), a region implicated in reward, and the same region activated
by winning during the outcome phase (see below).
We also modeled the decision phase using the epoch from the
onset of the default andnon-default cards to the time participants
responded. Similar response patterns were found. Switch choices
(relative to stay choices) activated the right anterior insula (42,
18, 6; peak z  2.89; p  0.05 svc) (Fig. 2A) and stay choices
(relative to switch) activated the left ventral striatum (18, 8,6;
peak z  2.64; p  0.06 svc) (Fig. 2B). Further, for the switch
minus stay contrast, increased frequency of switching was signif-
icantly correlated with decreased activity in right anterior insula
(38, 20, 6; peak z 3.03; p 0.05 svc) and increased activity in
left caudate (18, 22, 12; peak z 3.76; p 0.05 svc).
To examine the effect of previous outcomes (win or loss) on the
immediate subsequent stay or switch decisions, we estimated an-
othermodel inwhichwe used four regressors (previouswin-switch,
previous loss-switch, previous win-stay, and previous loss-stay) in-
stead of the two regressors (switch/stay). No significant effects were
observed in predicted areas of interest at p 0.001, in the following
contrasts: previouswin-switchminusprevious loss-switch; previous
loss-switch minus previous win-switch; previous win-stay minus
previous loss-stay; previous loss-stay minus previous win-stay; and
the interactions (current switch/stay choicesmodulated by previous
win/loss). Outside regions of interests, the postcentral gyrus (x 
60, y 0, z 22; peak z 4.16; p 0.001, uncorrected) showed
an effect for the interaction (i.e., [switch staywin loss]), but
no other effects were found.
Outcome phase: winning versus losing. For the outcome phase,
we found that winning outcome versus losing activated bilateral
ventral striatum (left:10, 12,12; peak z 4.34; p 0.001 svc;
right: 10, 14,6; peak z 4.05, p 0.002 svc) (Fig. 2B), ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (8, 46,2; peak z 3.88; p 0.0005
uncorrected), bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (left: 42, 42, 16;
peak z 4.15; p 0.0005 uncorrected; right: 44, 44,6; peak z
3.93; p  0.0005 uncorrected), and bilateral premotor cortex
(left: 14, 40, 50; peak z  3.74; p  0.0005 uncorrected; right:
24, 32, 48; peak z 4.05; p 0.0005 uncorrected). No significant
activation was found for the reverse contrast (i.e., losing vs win-
ning), which is consistent with previous findings (O’Doherty et
al., 2004; Tom et al., 2007).
Conjunction: stay versus switch and winning versus losing. A
conjunction analysis between stay minus switch decisions in the
decision phase and winning minus losing in the outcome phase
demonstrated that a region of left ventral striatum (18, 6,6;
peak z 3.08; p 0.05 svc) was activated in both conditions (Fig.
2B). Thus, our data suggest that choosing to staywith the defaults
might be rewarding in itself. This may be because it avoids the
Figure2. A,B, Right anterior insula (yellow) activated by switch versus stay choices (A), and
left ventral striatum (red) activated by the reverse comparison (stay versus switch) (B), over-
lappedwith striatum (yellow) activity responding towinning outcomes. A, C, For switch versus
stay comparison, insula (green) activity was negatively correlatedwith the tendency to switch,
while caudate (blue) activity was positively associated with switch frequency. D, Significant
activity associatedwith the residual frustration scores (i.e., frustration for Lswitch minus frustra-
tion for Lstay) in right anterior insula (red) for the comparisonof Lswitch versus Lstay outcomes and
significant activity in the right anterior insula (yellow) associated with switch versus stay deci-
sions. E, Significant activity associated with the residual satisfaction scores in ventral striatum
(red) for the comparison of Wswitch versus Wstay and significant activity in bilateral ventral
striatum (yellow) associated with winning versus losing. All activations are significant at p
0.05, small volume corrected.
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aversive quality of switching, produced by the combined effects
of outcomes after switching having an enhanced emotional qual-
ity and the established observation that anticipated losses loom
larger than anticipated gains (Kahneman et al., 1991).
The reverse conjunction between switch versus stay and losing
versuswinning did not produce a significant result.However, this
can be explained by the absence of significant activation for the
losing versus winning contrast.
Outcome phase: loss after switch versus loss after stay. As dis-
cussed, participants found itmore frustratingwhen they lost after
switching than when they lost after staying (Fig. 1C). To examine
whether the amount of frustration was related to the neural re-
sponse, we subtracted frustration scores for Lstay from frustration
scores for Lswitch to provide a residual frustration score. A corre-
lation analysis examining the relationship between residual frus-
tration scores and activation for the Lswitch minus Lstay contrast
revealed significant increases in right anterior insula (42, 14,12;
peak z 3.69; p 0.05 svc) (Fig. 2D), anterior cingulate cortex
(10, 38, 28; peak z 3.78; p 0.0005 uncorrected), and bilateral
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (left: 36, 30, 46; peak z  3.72;
p  0.0005 uncorrected; right: 38, 22, 50; peak z  4.08; p 
0.0005 uncorrected). The main group effect of Lswitch minus Lstay
did not identify any brain regions at the a priori threshold.
Thus, although the objective value of Lswitch and Lstay are iden-
tical, Lswitch is experienced as more aversive than Lstay, and the de-
gree of aversion is associated with anterior insula activation.
A conjunction analysis between Lswitch minus Lstay modulated
by residual frustration scores and switch minus stay choices (de-
cision phase) confirmed that the right anterior insula (42, 14,
12; peak z  3.69; p  0.05 svc) was activated in both condi-
tions. Our data suggest that the anticipation of the enhanced
frustration to switching and losing at the time of the decision
might underlie the loss aversion in the default preference.
Outcome phase: win after switch versus win after stay. Partici-
pants found it more rewarding for wins after switching than wins
after staying (Fig. 1D). The residual satisfaction scores (satisfac-
tion for Wswitch minus satisfaction for Wstay) were significantly
correlatedwith increased activity in right ventral striatum (10, 18,
6; peak z  3.13; p  0.05 svc) (Fig. 2E) and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (12, 40,4; peak z 3.80; p 0.0005 uncor-
rected) for this contrast. The only region engaged by the main
group effect ofWswitchminusWstay was the occipital cortex (16,
92, 12; peak z  3.32; p  0.001 uncorrected); indicating
that the neural responses in the ventral striatum and ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex were governed by the amount of sat-
isfaction participants experienced. The conjunction analysis
between Wswitch minus Wstay modulated by residual satisfaction
scores and winning minus losing outcomes confirmed that the
right ventral striatum (10, 18, 6; peak z  3.13; p  0.05 svc)
was activated in both conditions. Thus, both the behavioral and
neural evidence indicate that switching augments the rewarding
experience for positive outcomes.
Experiment 2
Behavioral data
Consistent with experiment 1, participants revealed a preference
for the default card (58.4% stay vs 41.6% switch; t14 14.61; p
0.001) and showed comparable reaction times for switch and stay
decisions (mean SD: 824 368ms for switch vs 783 336ms
for stay; t14  1.24; p  0.2), suggesting that the difference in
mental effort involved in switching was negligible.
Subjective emotion ratings after the experiment showed that
participants felt stronger frustration for Lswitch than Lstay (t14 
6.86; p 0.001), and expressedmore satisfaction forWswitch than
Wstay (t14  4.03; p  0.001). Similarly, the online emotion rat-
ings also revealed that participants felt stronger frustration for
Lswitch than for Lstay (t14 3.82; p 0.005), and expressed more
satisfaction for Wswitch than for Wstay (t14 4.10; p 0.001).
The residual frustration scores (i.e., frustration for Lswitch mi-
nus frustration for Lstay) for online emotion ratings were signifi-
cantly correlated with the residual frustration scores for ratings
collected after the experiment (r  0.68; p  0.005). The corre-
sponding correlation for the residual satisfaction scores was also
significant (r 0.61; p 0.02). The results therefore suggest that
emotion ratings collected after the experiment provide a valid
estimate of emotions experienced during the task.
Discussion
We investigated the neural basis of the default bias. Although
opting to switch in the decision phase (before win/loss outcome)
was associated with increased insula activity across all partici-
pants, individual differences in frequency of switching showed a
negative relationship with insula activation and a positive rela-
tionship with caudate activation. Notably, the same insular area
showed a positive relationship with frustration after switching
away from the default and losing. In contrast, deciding to stay
with the default engaged the ventral striatum, a region implicated
in reward processing (O’Doherty et al., 2004), including winning
outcomes in our current study. In the context of previous data on
the function of these regions in motivational processes, our re-
sults not only support theories that aversive mechanisms influ-
ence decisions to stay with the default but provide new evidence,
suggesting that it is rewarding to stay put. These findings were
observed despite an equal probability that the default card was
associated with win or loss, and controlling for any social factors
(e.g., conformity to a default social norm).
The patterns of activation for switch versus stay (insula) and
stay versus switch (ventral striatum) contrasts during the deci-
sion phase are striking because the objective outcomes associated
with these options were equivalent and the effort involved in
selecting each was comparable (i.e., both required a button-press
response with equivalent execution times). So, what makes these
two types of choices different? One contributory factor may arise
from the observation that the subjective experience of outcomes
after stay and after switch is different and participants may there-
fore anticipate this. The behavioral results demonstrate that out-
comes resulting from choosing the non-default choice generally
lead to more intense affective reactions than the same outcomes
achieved through selecting the default. A second contributory
factor is the established observation that losses loom larger than
gains (Kahneman et al., 1991), resulting in an overall bias to avoid
intense aversive events associated with switching and losing.
The insula has been implicated in anticipation and receipt of
risky, aversive stimuli (Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2008;
Craig, 2009), and insula damage can result in elevated risk taking
(Clark et al., 2008). These studies suggest that the insula is in-
volved in generating anticipatory somatic markers of risky, aver-
sive events. Similarly, in our own study, insula activity elicited by
switchingmight represent an aversive somatic state whenmaking
switch choices, since these are perceived as more risky than out-
comes associated with stay choices for the reasons outlined. Con-
sistent with this, we found that overall switch choices, compared
with overall stay choices, resulted in a stronger aversive somatic
maker (i.e., insula activation). Similarly, and in line with the ob-
servation that insula activity is associated with heightened skin
conductance responses (SCRs) (Buchel et al., 1998; Critchley et
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al., 2000), Bechara et al. (1997) found that participants showed
more pronounced anticipatory SCRs before choosing from risky
than safe decks in the Iowa gambling task. Moreover, consistent
with our observation that insula activation to switch minus stay
choices in the decision phase was negatively related to the fre-
quency of switch choices, Dunn et al. (2010) showed that the
differential SCR between selection of risky and safe card decks
was negatively related to the frequency of risky deck selections in
a modified Iowa gambling task. A role for the insula area identi-
fied in processing risky aversive events is further supported by
our observation that Lswitch minus Lstay events in the outcome
phase modulated by residual frustration scores identified the
same insula region associated with switch choices in the decision
phase. By contrast, stayingwith the default engaged the same area
as winning (ventral striatum) and might be rewarding in itself
(Seymour et al., 2004).
Finding that frequency of switching was negatively correlated
with right anterior insula and positively correlated with left cau-
date accordswith the idea that default/non-default decisionmak-
ing involves a tradeoff between avoiding high loss (Lswitch) and
seeking high reward (Wswitch). Thus, individuals who show rela-
tively greater insula and relatively reduced caudate activity at the
decision stage might end up choosing to stay with the default more
often because for them, the anticipation of loss-after-switching,
which is more aversive than loss-after-default-selection as our be-
havioral data show, outweighs the pleasure of anticipation of win-
after-switching. In contrast, relatively greater caudate and relatively
reduced insula activity at the decision stage might emphasize the
enhanced positive experience associated with switching and win-
ning, encouraging the subject to take the risk and switch. Consis-
tent with this, recent studies have shown increased activation in
the caudate nucleus when subjects anticipate or imagine pos-
itive future events (Knutson et al., 2001; Sharot et al., 2007,
2009). However, in line with the proposal that anticipated
losses loom larger than anticipated wins, the overall group bias
is to avoid loss.
Our observation that choosing defaults or non-defaults af-
fected individuals’ subjective evaluation of monetary outcomes
and patterns of neural activity accords with previous work show-
ing that the experience of an event is highly subjective and can
vary substantially depending on the context. For example, fMRI
research has consistently demonstrated that ventral striatal re-
sponses to the same amount of reward differ depending on the
range of possible outcomes from which an outcome was selected
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005), its relative magnitude in relation to
another participant’s reward (Fliessbach et al., 2007), and the
choice commitment (Sharot et al., 2009). Consistent with these
studies, we showed that striatal and insula activity in response to
winning and losing outcomes, respectively, varied depending on
whether the outcomewas achieved through choosing a default or
not. Similarly, there is evidence that expectation can profoundly
modulate subjective experience of aversive stimuli (e.g., aversive
taste, painful stimulation) and associated insula activity (Koyama
et al., 2005; Nitschke et al., 2006). Our findings suggest that both
aversion/risk-sensitive (e.g., insula) and reward-sensitive (e.g.,
striatum) brain areas can track the subjective hedonic experience
of stimuli in the financial domain, even when their objective
values are the same.
Although we propose that emotions play an important role in
mediating the default bias, a more precise explanation of why
emotional reactions to outcomes after switch are amplified re-
mains unclear. One possibility is that participants feel more re-
sponsible for outcomes following switch choices and that
responsibility is the primary cause of enhanced emotions
(Zeelenberg et al., 2002). Alternatively, choosing to switch may
make participants more likely to engage in counterfactual think-
ing, comparing actual outcomes with “what might have been,”
because outcomes associated with defaults may serve as a salient
reference point (Kahneman et al., 1991). Future studies could test
these possibilities by manipulating factors such as whether the
participants themselves or another person makes the stay/switch
choices.
The default bias can take many different forms depending on
the nature of the default (e.g., to remain silent/inactive, to accept
an assigned gambling card, or to conform to social norms).
Whether or not other forms of default bias can be explained by
the mechanisms identified here remains to be fully explored.
However, recent fMRI research investigating a different variant
of the default bias suggests that distinct mechanisms may under-
lie some different forms. Fleming et al. (2010) used a paradigm in
which participants made a perceptual decision as to whether a
ball fell within a tramline or outside it. On different trials, one of
the options (in/out) was assigned as the default. Accepting it re-
quired no active response (continue to depress a key), whereas re-
jecting it required an overt action. Results showed that participants
were more likely to accept the default when the perceptual decision
was difficult but not when it was easy. In addition, rejecting the
default on difficult, but not on easy, trials activated the subtha-
lamic nucleus, a region implicated in overcoming response sup-
pression and initiating an overt action (Isoda and Hikosaka,
2008). The discrepancies between the results of this study and our
own might be explained by the different experimental designs.
The paradigmof Fleming et al. (2010)minimized the influence of
psychological variables such as loss aversion, included no imme-
diate monetary feedback during the task, and required an active
response on switch trials only. In contrast, our paradigm was
optimized to investigate the role of emotions in the default bias by
presentingmonetary feedback after stay or switch choices on each
trial and switch and stay options both required an active button-
press response, matched for execution time.
In conclusion, our results identify the neural mechanisms
contributing to the default inertia. These include an anticipatory
somatic signal in the insula as a potential mechanism for loss
aversion and a ventral striatal mechanism associated with default
selection encompassing the same area as winning, implying that
selecting the default might be rewarding in itself. These effects
were found in the absence of switching cost (e.g., increased effort)
and social influences (e.g., conformity to default social norms).
While the functional basis of the default preference is still open to
debate, our study highlights the key role of emotions inmediating
this bias, illustrating that the power of default preference in both
policy-making as well as more routine everyday behaviors is
driven by basic emotional systems.
References
Anderson CJ (2003) The psychology of doing nothing: forms of decision
avoidance result from reason and emotion. Psychol Bull 129:139–167.
Bechara A, Damasio H, Tranel D, Damasio AR (1997) Deciding advanta-
geously before knowing the advantageous strategy. Science 275:1293–1295.
Buchel C, Morris J, Dolan RJ, Friston KJ (1998) Brain systems mediating
aversive conditioning: an event-related fMRI study. Neuron 20:947–957.
Clark L, Bechara A, Damasio H, Aitken MR, Sahakian BJ, Robbins TW
(2008) Differential effects of insular and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
lesions on risky decision-making. Brain 131:1311–1322.
Craig AD (2009) How do you feel–now? The anterior insula and human
awareness. Nat Rev Neurosci 10:59–70.
Critchley HD, Elliott R, Mathias CJ, Dolan RJ (2000) Neural activity
relating to generation and representation of galvanic skin conductance
14706 • J. Neurosci., November 3, 2010 • 30(44):14702–14707 Yu et al. • Insula and StriatumMediate the Default Bias
responses: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. J Neurosci
20:3033–3040.
DunnB,GaltonH,MorganR, EvansD,Oliver C,MeyerM,CusackR, Lawrence
A,DalglieshT(2010)Listening toyourheart: how interoception shapes emo-
tion experience and intuitive decisionmaking. Psychol Sci, in press.
Fleming SM, Thomas CL, Dolan RJ (2010) Overcoming status quo bias in
the human brain. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 107:6005–6009.
Fliessbach K, Weber B, Trautner P, Dohmen T, Sunde U, Elger CE, Falk A
(2007) Social comparison affects reward-related brain activity in the hu-
man ventral striatum. Science 318:1305–1308.
Friston KJ, Penny WD, Glaser DE (2005) Conjunction revisited. Neuroim-
age 25:661–667.
Isoda M, Hikosaka O (2008) Role for subthalamic nucleus neurons in
switching from automatic to controlled eye movement. J Neurosci
28:7209–7218.
Johnson EJ, Goldstein D (2003) Medicine. Do defaults save lives? Science
302:1338–1339.
Kahneman D, Miller D (1986) Norm theory: comparing reality to its alter-
natives. Psychol Rev 93:136–153.
KahnemanD, Knetsch J, Thaler R (1991) Anomalies: the endowment effect,
loss aversion, and status quo bias. J Econ Perspect 5:193–206.
Knutson B, Adams CM, Fong GW, Hommer D (2001) Anticipation of in-
creasing monetary reward selectively recruits nucleus accumbens. J Neu-
rosci 21:RC159.
Koyama T, McHaffie JG, Laurienti PJ, Coghill RC (2005) The subjective
experience of pain: where expectations become reality. ProcNatl Acad Sci
U S A 102:12950–12955.
Nieuwenhuis S, Heslenfeld DJ, von Geusau NJ,Mars RB, Holroyd CB, Yeung
N (2005) Activity in human reward-sensitive brain areas is strongly con-
text dependent. Neuroimage 25:1302–1309.
Nitschke JB, Dixon GE, Sarinopoulos I, Short SJ, Cohen JD, Smith EE,
Kosslyn SM, Rose RM, Davidson RJ (2006) Altering expectancy damp-
ens neural response to aversive taste in primary taste cortex. Nat Neurosci
9:435–442.
O’Doherty J, Dayan P, Schultz J, Deichmann R, Friston K, Dolan RJ (2004)
Dissociable roles of ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental condi-
tioning. Science 304:452–454.
Paulus MP, Rogalsky C, Simmons A, Feinstein JS, Stein MB (2003) In-
creased activation in the right insula during risk-taking decisionmaking is
related to harm avoidance and neuroticism. Neuroimage 19:1439–1448.
Preuschoff K, Quartz SR, Bossaerts P (2008) Human insula activation re-
flects risk prediction errors as well as risk. J Neurosci 28:2745–2752.
Samuelson W, Zeckhauser R, J (1988) Status quo bias in decision making.
J Risk Uncertainty 1:7–59.
Seymour B, O’Doherty JP, Dayan P, Koltzenburg M, Jones AK, Dolan RJ,
Friston KJ, Frackowiak RS (2004) Temporal difference models describe
higher-order learning in humans. Nature 429:664–667.
Sharot T, Riccardi AM, Raio CM, Phelps EA (2007) Neural mechanisms
mediating optimism bias. Nature 450:102–105.
Sharot T, De Martino B, Dolan RJ (2009) How choice reveals and shapes
expected hedonic outcome. J Neurosci 29:3760–3765.
Tom SM, Fox CR, Trepel C, Poldrack RA (2007) The neural basis of loss
aversion in decision-making under risk. Science 315:515–518.
Tzourio-Mazoyer N, Landeau B, Papathanassiou D, Crivello F, Etard O,
Delcroix N,Mazoyer B, JoliotM (2002) Automated anatomical labeling
of activations in SPM using a macroscopic anatomical parcellation of the
MNI MRI single-subject brain. Neuroimage 15:273–289.
Zeelenberg M, van de Bos K, van Dijk E, Pieters R (2002) The inaction effect
in the psychology of regret. J Pers Soc Psychol 82:314–327.
Yu et al. • Insula and StriatumMediate the Default Bias J. Neurosci., November 3, 2010 • 30(44):14702–14707 • 14707
